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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
absence of any unreasonable delay; and no longer need the insurer look upon
the jury with trepidation: he is not shouldered with the burden of proof to
refute the plaintiff's contentions, and an adverse jury verdict will thereby
be the more easily reversible as a matter of law." Its enactment can be
regarded as the only measure that will be effective to alleviate the burden cast
by the presumption upon insurer, beneficiary, and court.
RELAXATION OF THE REQUIREM ENT OF DELiVERY IN GI'TS OF PMRSONAL
PRoPERT.-There is a current tendency in our law to minimize the importance
of certain formalities and requirements which have heretofore been deemed
integral parts of the common law. Legislative zeal, unhampered by precedent
has dissipated the aura of magic which pervaded the seal.' Written releases,
not under seal, are now effective without consideration, 2 and the seal no longer
shields the undisclosed principal.3 The abolition of the doctrine of considera-
tion has recently been advocated.4 As if in consonance with this position, and
to fill a gap left by the dethroned seal, certain states have adopted legislation
making gratuitous promises enforceable when the signer of the written instru-
ment asserts therein an intention to be legally bound., A stone's throw from
67. Id. § 2494.
1. For a consideration of the various state statutes, affecting the common law force
of the seal, and citations thereof, see, 1 WmUS=ON, CoTRwc'rs (rev'd ed. 1936) § 218.
Some twenty years ago the attention of the Bar and the Legislature of New York was
called to the fact that the rules with regard to the seal in that state had been so riddled
with exceptions, as to cause a condition of confusion which required statutory remedy.
The classification of documents according to their nature and importance was suggested
as a substitute for the seal. Crane, The Magic of thd Private Seal (1915) 15 COL. L. Rzv.
24. "In the early days of the common law, where people could not read and write, the
presence of the seal was all-important.... Today, however, when people in general can read
and write, and when, therefore, courts are face to face with different social and economic
conditions, the importance of the signature is magnified, and the significance of the seal
has waned, illustrating that our feet must keep to Mother Earth though our thoughts
may soar into the clouds." Wormser, The Development of the Law (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rv.
701, 706-707.
2. The New York Legislature, in recent years, has passed statutes concerning releases
under seal, modification of sealed instruments, the seal as evidence of consideration, and
the seal as protector of the undisclosed principal. N. Y. DEBTOR AND CalnieoR LAW
(Supp. 1936) § 243 reads as follows: RELzAsa iw Wmnmo WmrxouT CONSmManx0N OR
SzA. A written instrument, hereafter executed, which purports to be a total or partial
release of all claims, debts, demands or obligations, or a .total or partial release of any
particular claim, debt, demand or obligation, or a release or discharge in whole or In part
of a mortgage, lien or charge upon personal or real property, shall not be invalid because
of the absence of consideration or of a seal.
3. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Act (1936) § 342 reads:
2. The rights and liabilities of an undisclosed principal under any sealed Instrument
hereafter executed shall be the same as if the instrument had not been sealed.
4. Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abolished from the Common
Law? (1936) 49 HAnv. L. Rav. 1225.
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enforceable gratuitous promises is the law of gifts, and there, too, reverbera-
tions of this spirit of change have been felt. Especially noticeable is the
relaxation that has taken place in the requirement of delivery in effecting valid
gifts of personal property, and it is this phase of the law of gifts which we
propose to consider.
It is generally stated, and correctly so, that a valid gift is composed of three
elements; donative intention, delivery, and acceptance. Stated in the abstract
this proposition sounds simple enough, but it is quite another story when an
attempt is made to elicit these factors from a concrete situation. Of the three,
if the amount of litigation be a true criterion, the requirement of delivery
presents the most difficult problem. This is readily understandable, for, as we
shall see, the content of that principle has been changing through the years,
and at no one time has its application been harmonious. The movement is
toward a more liberal rule. Courts have been gradually whittling away the
common law conception of the requirement of delivery, and thus have pro-
duced an enlarged area within which a valid delivery will be upheld. This
change is to a large extent attributable to a growing recognition of the
probative value of written evidence,0 and to the reluctance on the part of
some courts to let seeming technicalities obstruct the effectuation of clearly
evidenced donative intentY
The requirement of delivery effectively consolidates three precautionary
measures into the law of gifts. (1) It impresses upon the donor the serious-
ness of what he is doing, and thus protects him from his own rashness. (2) In
conjunction with the otherwise expressed intention it furnishes unequivocal,
external evidence to third parties that a gift is being effectuated. (3) It places
in the possession of the donee some tangible evidence of the validity of his
titleY Desirable as these measures undoubtedly are from the viewpoint of
sound policy, they should not be considered as absolute indicia of the pres-
ence of a legal delivery, for all three might be present in a given transaction
yet the gift would fail for want of proper delivery.0 Attention should be called
5. The U rom Wirmm OBriCurroNs Acr adopted, thus far, by Pennsylvania and
Utah, reads:
1. A written release or promise hereafter made and signed by the person releasing or
promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing
also contains an additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer
intends to be legally bound.
6. See the Urro au Wpxr= OaBrzcAroxs Acr note 5, suPra. This tendency is e-pecially
noticeable in those cases, in the lower courts of New York, which have upheld gifts effected
by delivery of an informal instrument of gift. See note 82, infra.
7. "Generally the delivery must be as perfect as the nature of the property will
admit, but the manifest desire of the donor will not be set aside by a narrow construc-
tion that would defeat his purpose." Gray's Adm'r v. Dixon, 255 Ky. 239, 244, 73 S. W.
(2d) 6, 8 (1934).
S. Philip Mechem, in a classic analysis of the requirement of delivery, sets forth theze
three reasons for the desirability of an act of delivery. Mechem, The Reqzirement of
Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Cizoses in Action Evidenced by Corrinercibi Instrw.
ments (1926) 21 IRx. L. R .341, 348-349.
9. An example of this type of case is the delivery of a commercial bank boolk, to
19371
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to another aspect of this requirement of an act of delivery. Not only does it
aid in determining the presence of donative intention and provide some safe-
guard against the assertion of spurious claims, but it serves to circumscribe,
too narrowly it would seem to some, the field of donative intention to which
legal effect will be given. In this last respect it is similar to consideration, for
in the absence of one or the other of these two factors, namely, delivery and
consideration, donative or contractual intention, no matter how conclusively
evidenced, would be unenforceable. The virtue of requirements such as
delivery in the law of gifts, and consideration in the law of contracts, lies in
the fact that their presence usually accompanies the desired intention and
hence affords a ready indicator of the existence of the proper degree of
intention to which legal effect will be given.
It would seem advisable, at this point, to consider the meaning of certain
terms customarily present in gift cases. Unfortunately, courts have not
always been too circumspect in their choice of language and consequently
such decisions render meticulous analysis difficult. A ready example is the
use of the ambiguous phrase "a good constructive or symbolical delivery." 10
When one reads that phrase one wonders whether the terms "constructive or
symbolical" are used interchangeably, or in the alternative; or whether the
court thought that, as far as the particular case was concerned, it was imma-
terial which kind of delivery had taken place. Some courts expressly dis-
tinguish between the two, and uphold gifts by constructive delivery, but reject
gifts attempted by symbolical delivery on the ground that such delivery
neither divests the donor of dominion nor confers it upon the donee.1 When
courts thus distinguish between the terms; actual delivery refers to a direct
physical transfer of the res; constructive delivery contemplates a transfer of the
effective means of coming to the use or actual possession of the res; and sym-
bolical delivery refers to the tradition of a mere sign ii lieu of the res. For
example, an actual delivery would take place if A handed B, a watch. There
would be a constructive delivery if the watch were contained in a safe deposit
box and A gave B the key. A symbolical delivery would occur if A handed
to B his watch fob, as representative of the watch to which it was usually
attached. Simple enough does it seem, but at times such distinctions are
difficult indeed to draw.
It is important to bear one other distinction in mind when considering gift
cases. American courts, generally speaking, require the same kind of de-
complete a gift of the account therein stated. See note 54, infra. The delivery of an
informal letter of gift ib lieu of the res is another example. See note 82, infra. To the
contrary are those cases which have upheld gifts of chattels by instruments, expressly
because the instrument was under seal.
10. E.g. Matter of Van Alstyne, 207 N. Y. 298, 100 N. E. 802 (1913); Pushcart v.
Dry Dock Savings Inst., 140 Misc. 579, 251 N. Y. Supp. 184 (N. Y. City Ct. 1931);
Hillebrandt v. Brewer, 6 Tex. 45 (1851).
11. Beebe v. Coffin, 153 Cal. 174, 94 Pac. 766 (1908); Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C.
524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898); Apache State Bank v. Daniels, 32 Okla. 121, 121 Pac. 237
(1911); Thomas, Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 15 S. E. 389 (1892). Contra: McCoy's Adm'r
v. McCoy, 126 Ky. 783, 104 S. W. 1031 (1907); Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176
N. Y. Supp. 225 (2d Dep't 1919). See cases cited note 82, infra.
[Vol. 6
COMMENTS
livery whether a gift inter vivos or one causa vnortis is alleged.'^ While paying
homage to this stated uniformity, courts will scrutinize the evidence more
closely and require more convincing proof when a gift causa mortis is alleged
than in the case of one inter vivos.13  This attitude of suspicion is attributa-
ble to the fact that gifts causa inorti, have all the effect of testamentary gifts,
yet are singularly free of their protecting formalities. It is arguable that this
distinction, between kind of delivery, and degree of proof of delivery, is rather
tenuous. This much can be said, that as a matter of fact, despite the unity
in kind of delivery existing between gifts inter vivos and causa morris, the
variance in proof may be reflected in a difference in result.
Delivery of Chattels
In deference to the important notion of seisin, at early common law manual
tradition was required to transfer the absolute property in a chattel, and this
was true whether a gift or sale was contemplated.14 Certainly as regards gifts
of chattels this requirement finds no counterpart in the Roman law."a But,
subsequently, where the physical character of the res rendered an immediate
actual transfer impossible, delivery of the means of acquiring or using it would
suffice.' Passing time witnessed the admission of two exceptions; convey-
ance by deed, and title transfer in accordance with the intention of the par-
ties in contract of sale.17 In the case of gifts, further relaxations have mani-
fested themselves in an ever-widening application of the doctrine of "construc-
tive delivery," a tendency towards the acceptance of "symbolical delivery,"
and a certain willingness to effectuate donative intent by inferring delivery.
A normal gift of a chattel would take place if A handed his watch to B
12. Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602 (1882); Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88 (1869); Brooks
v. Mitchell, 163 Md. 1, 161 AtL. 261 (1932); Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E.
848 (1S98). In England, gifts causa viortis of choses in action evidenced by non-negotia-
ble commercial documents are upheld when the document is delivered. Under the same
circumstances, a gift inter vivos would fail. See p. 117, infra.
13. Foley v. Coan, 272 Mass. 207, 172 N. E. 74 (1930); Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y.
17 (1872). "Gifts causa mortis are not favored in law. They are a fruitful source of
litigation, often bitter, protracted and expensive. They lack all those formalities and
safeguards which the law throws around wills, and create a strong temptation to the
commission of fraud and perjury." Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 324, 326 (1868).
14. See 1 WLLasToN, SALts (2d ed. 1924) § 350. "We think it fairly certain that
the ownership of a chattel could not be transferred from one person to another, either
by way of gift, or by way of sale, without a traditio rd. . . .We doubt whether, accord-
ing to medieval law, one could ever be full owner of goods, unless as executor, without
having acquired actual possession. We do not doubt that the modem refinements of
constructive delivery were unthought of, at all events in the thirteenth century:" 2
Por.Acx: m M= Axrrr.AD, HISTORY or ENGi.SHir LAw (2d ed. 1924) 180-181.
15. L'srruTs or JusTIa=, L lib. II. tit. VII. § 2.
16. Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. Sr. 348, 27 Eng. Reprints 1074 (Ch. 1749). See Ward v.
Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, 443, 28 Eng. Reprints 275, 282 (Ch. 17S2).
17. An exhaustive treatment of the history of gifts of chattels by deed is contained
in the opinion of Fry, LJ., in Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q.B.). 57 (1890). Note especially
pp. 72-73. The gift of a chattel by deed, without an accompanying tradition of the
chattel, seems to have been first held valid during the reign of Edward IV. Id. at 67.
1937]
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accompanying the act with appropriate language indicative of present dona-
tive intent. But let us suppose that A had left his watch at home and orally
expressed the same sentiment. The language might be construed in two
ways, either as words of gift in futuro, or of present gift. In the former
case the executory promise would fail for want of consideration; 1  in the
latter, the gift would fail for want of delivery. It is fundamental that dona-
tive intention, no matter how dearly evidenced, will be ineffectual without
the occurrence of some acceptable form of delivery.19 Between actual manual
delivery and mere donative intent is an unchartered area wherein unusual
methods have been employed to satisfy the requirement of delivery, and it is
these abnormal situations which beget relaxed requirements. Here the desire
to effectuate dearly evidenced donative intent and the necessity of delivery
clash and must be reconciled.
Constructive and Symbolical Delivery
It was intimated in two early English cases that the gift of a bulky object
such as a trunk might be constructively effected through the instrumentality
of a key.20 The reasoning behind these cases was that certain personal prop-
erty, by reason of its bulk, might render actual delivery impossible or highly
impracticable, and therefore some mode should be provided whereby such
property could be transferred with due regard to the requirement of delivery.
It was felt, that in such cases, in lieu of actual delivery, delivery of the effec-
tive means of acquiring or coming to the use of the subject of gift should
suffice. It is to be noted that, as originally conceived, the sole justification
for the use of a constructive delivery, such as the tradition of a key, was a
res which because of its bulk was incapable of manual delivery. This con-
ception of constructive delivery, based upon the size of the subject of gift
and a transfer of the means of controlling it, finds some expression in Ameri-
can cases. As was said in Hatch v. Atkinson:21 "the rule is that the delivery
must be as perfect and complete as the nature of the articles will admit of."
A rule so strict breeds exceptions. Soon enough courts displayed a willingness
to further relax the requirement of a delivery by permitting a constructive
delivery when, the article, although small in size and hence susceptible of
manual delivery, was nevertheless not present. In Newman v. Bost,22 we
find an interesting case wherein the court considered the position as well as
the nature of the res in reaching its conclusion. In that case the donor on
his deathbed handed the intended donee a bunch of keys saying that whatever
was in the house would henceforth belong to the donee. The court held that
18. Gammons Theological Seminary v. Robbins, 128 Ind. 85, 27 N. E. 341 (1891);
Banner Window Glass Co. v. Barriat, 85 W. Va. 750, 102 S. E. 726 (1920).
19. Kelley-Koett Mfg. Co. v. Goldenberg, 207 Ky. 695, 270 S. W. 15 (1925); Brink v.
Gould, 43 How. Pr. 289 (N. Y. 1872); Walsh's Appea, 122 Pa. 177, 15 Atl. 470 (1888).
2 K xNT, Commr. *438. But see cases cited in notes 37 and 38, infra.
20. Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300, 24 Eng. Reprints 143 (Ch. 1710). See Ward v.
Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, 443, 28 Eng. Reprints 275, 282 (Ch. 1752.)
21. 56 Me. 324, 331 (1868).
22. 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898).
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there had been a valid delivery of the bureau situated in the room of the gift
transaction, for the key which opened that bureau had been delivered. But it
further held that there had not been a good delivery of an insurance policy,
locked in a drawer of that bureau, since that was present and capable of de-
livery. The court said: "but where the articles are present and are capable
of manual delivery this must be had."2 The inference to be drawn from such
a statement is that were the insurance policy not present the decision would
have been otherwise. A familiar example of a gift of articles, capable of
manual delivery, by constructive delivery, is the so-called safe deposit box gift
case.24 The reason why one may make a valid gift of the contents of a
safe deposit box by delivery of the key is, that although the articles con-
tained therein are necessarily small, the box itself is, usually, not present when
the gift is made. Thus we see that whereas originally a constructive delivery
was only justified when the object given was bulky, it was now possible to
use that mode of delivery when the thing given was small, but not present.
Not satisfied with the inroads that had been made into the original con-
ception of delivery, a few courts have gone so far as to uphold gifts by con-
structive delivery when the res was present and capable of manual delivery.
In Cooper v. Burr,2 there was an attempted gift causa mortis of certain coin
and jewelry contained in a trunk and bureau situated in the room of the gift
transaction. In upholding a gift of these by delivery of the keys of the trunk
and bureau the court said: "The fact that the trunks and bureau or their
contents were not removed, or even handled, so far as appears from the evi-
dence is not a controlling consideration in this case." - 0 Here the transfer of
the key, taken in conjunction with the other circumstaces of the case, was
considered such excellent proof of donative intent that the accessibility of the
res was not a determining factor.
As we have seen, originally constructive delivery was only warranted when
there was an object of gift physically incapable of manual delivery. Sub-
sequently, it was held permissible when the res, though by nature capable of
manual tradition was nevertheless inaccessible, because absent, when the
gift was made. Finally, a few courts have gone so far as to uphold gifts by
constructive delivery when the article given was present and capable of manual
delivery.
The relaxations that have taken place in the conception of the requirement
of delivery have not stopped there. The statement has threaded its way
through the cases that delivery, whether actual or constructive, must be
such as to absolutely divest the donor of dominion and confer it upon the
23. Id.
24. See cases cited in notes 30 and 32, infra.
25. 45 Barb. 9 (N. Y. 1865).
26. Id. at 34. In accord with this view is Debinson v. Emmons, 158 Ma-. 592, 33
N. E. 706 (1893). Cf. Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300, 24 Eng. Reprints 143 (Ch. 1710).
Contra: Knight v. Tripp, 121 Cal. 674, 54 Pac. 267 (1898); Newmnn v. Bost, 122 N. C.
524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898); Apache State Bank v. Daniels, 32 Ok1a. 121, 121 Pac. 237
(1911); Newsome v. Alien, 86 Wash. 678, 151 Pac. 111 (1915). Cf. Dunn v. Houghton,
51 AtL 71 (N. J. Ch. 1902).
1937]
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donee.2 7  One wonders whether that statement represents the rule or an ideal,
when he considers the number of cases in which the gift has been upheld, though
the donor still retained some dominion, or, where the donee did not acquire
complete control because of some dominion possessed by a third party. In
this connection, it would seem appropriate to discuss some of the interesting
and complicated problems in the law of gifts which arise from the safe deposit
box cases. The attempted gift of the contents of a safe deposit box by tra-
dition of the key thereof furnishes an appropriate setting for the application
of the doctrine of constructive delivery. Since the box itself is usually con-
tained in a bank vault, it is ordinarily not accessible when the gift is made,
and hence the delivery of the key thereof serves as a constructive delivery
of the objects contained in the box. Inasmuch as the safe deposit box
has no intrinsic value and its sole function is to serve as a depository
for valuables, the act of key-transference affords a firm basis for inferring
the presence of donative intent. Tradition of the key to a trunk or bureau, on
the other hand, does not unequivocally point to a transfer of its contents;
the gift might well be of the trunk or bureau itself.28  Conceding that the
delivery of a safe deposit box key will work a constructive delivery of its
contents, 29 what is to be said of those situations, which are becoming more and
more common, wherein a written order of the donor is required in addition
to the key, or the bank retains a guard key without which the box cannot be
opened, or the donor possesses a duplicate key? Clearly, in these cases,
tradition of a key by the donor does not work an absolute change of dominion;
either the donor retains some dominion, or the donee receives but partial
control, because the bank possesses a key which is necessary if the objects
in the box are to be obtained. Yet what little authority there is, leans toward
acceptance of the proposition that retention of a duplicate key by the donor
does not invalidate the gift.3 0 So also the tendency is to validate the gift
even though the bank requires a written order; as between the donor and
donee the delivery is good since the requirement of a writing is considered to
be for the bank's protection.31 An analogous situation is presented when two
27. Brewer's Adm'r v. Brewer, 181 Ky. 400, 205 S. W. 393 (1918); Brooks v. Mitchell,
163 Md. 1, 161 Atl. 261 (1932); Reynolds v. Hanson, 191 S. W. 1030 (Mo. App. 1917);
Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898); Apache State Bank v. Daniels, 32
Okla. 121, 121 Pac. 237 (1911); Woods v. Woods, 49 P. (2d) 416 (Utah 1935).
28. In Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898), the court bolstered its
decision, so to speak, by calling attention to this distinction between a deposit box, and
a bureau or trunk. In the former case, delivery of the key is a more significant and less
equivocal act.
29. See cases cited in notes 30 and 32, infra.
30. Rule v. Fleming, 85 Ind. App. 487, 152 N. E. 181 (1926); Gilkinson v. Third Ave.
R. R. Co., 47 App. Div. 472, 63 N. Y. Supp. 792 (2d Dep't 1900). Cf. Thomas, Adm'r
v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 15 S. E. 389 (1892) wherein the duplicate key was given to a third
party as a precautionary measure. Contra: Bauernschmidt v. Bauernschmidt, 97 Md. 35,
54 AtI. 637 (1903).
31. Though no case has been found wherein a written order was withheld by the
donor and the key delivered, the conclusion that such a gift would be valid seems
inescapable in view of the cases cited at note 62, infra, holding gifts of savings bank
(Vol. 6
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keys are required to open the box, one of which the bank retains. Clearly this
is a precautionary device. If renting the box is a lease of space, and the bank
a custodian of the contents, then it would seem that the same rule should be
applied as in the case where a written order is required. So in Harrison v.
Foley,32 it was held that the possession of a guard key by the safe deposit com-
pany would not render the delivery imperfect. The court stressed the fact
that the donor had been divested of dominion. Assuming that the guard key
is a mere protective device, the holding of the case would seem to be sound,
for as between the donor and donee there has been a transfer of dominion.
But if the bank is deemed to have legal possession by reason of the reten-
tion of a key it might well be contended that tradition of the donor's key
will not suffice; 33 that something in the nature of an attornment by the bank
should be required to complete the gift. The foregoing consideration of safe
deposit cases at least points to a relaxation of the doctrine that absolute
dominion must be transferred to satisfy the requirements of delivery.
Courts which have adopted a relaxed conception of actual or constructive
delivery, base their decisions on a principle which has been thus formulated:
"The delivery necessary to consummate a gift must be as perfect as the
nature of the property and the circumstances and surroundings of the parties
will reasonably permit."34  It is difficult to conceive of a more liberal rule.
Thus stated the principle is so broad and permits such latitude that the
temper of each court will ultimately determine whether necessity or mere con-
venience is the test applied to the case at hand. Typical of the flexibility of
this principle are the following cases which exemplify at best a vitiated form
of constructive delivery. In the stated situations, there has been found a
valid delivery: where a father branded cattle and recorded the brand in
his fifteen year old daughter's name, even though he retained possession of
the cattle; 35 and where a physically infirm father pointed out to his daugh-
ter places wherein he had secreted money, accompanying his actions with
words expressive of present donative intent.30  In this last case knowledge,
accounts valid, by transfer of the book, without the required written order. Cf. Har-
rison v. Foley, 206 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913); Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 26
N. E. 627 (1891); Thomas, Adm'r v. Lewis, 89 Va. 1, 15 S. E. 389 (1892).
32. 206 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913).
33. For cases holding that the relationship between the deposit box renter and the
bank is that of bailor and bailee see: National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58
(1914); Rosendahl v. Lemhi Valley Bank, 43 Idaho 273, 251 Pac. 293 (1926); Moon
v. First National Bank, 287 Pa. 398, 135 At. 114 (1926). But see Carples v. Cumber-
land Coal & Iron Co., 240 N. Y. 187, 192, 148 N. E. 185, 186 (1925) to the effect that
such relationship is closer to that of landlord and tenant.
34. Matter of Van Alstyne, 207 N. Y. 298, 309, 100 N. E. 802, 806 (1913).
35. Hillebrandt v. Brewer, 6 Tex. 45 (1851).
36. Waite v. Grubbe, 43 Ore. 406, 73 Pac. 206 (1906). Conyra: Shankle v. Spahr, 121 Va.
598, 93 S. E. 605 (1917) (holding that there must be a tangible means of control trans-
ferred to constitute constructive delivery). An interesting case from the factual stand-
point is Collins v. Baxter, 164 So. 61 (Ala. 1935) wherein it was alleged that the donor
had delivered a map indicating where he had secreted some coin. The case is hardly
an authority since the court was willing to concede a valid symbolical delivery in as much




alone, was "delivered" which was in effect the "key" to possession of the res.
The court stressed the fact that the age and infirmity of the donor precluded
him from exerting physical control over the res and therefore absolute do-
minion had been transferred. An extreme example of the erosion of the
delivery principle accomplished by applying the rule of "best delivery reasona-
bly possible under all the circumstances" is exemplified by a case in which
a man sick in a hospital, in the presence of the doctor, told the alleged donee
that he wished to give him his savings bank account. The bank book was
locked in the cashier's office and hence unavailable. The doctor said he would
procure it the next day and deliver it to the donee. Although the donor
died before the delivery of the bank book was made, it was held to have
been a valid gift.3 7 Even more startling is the case of Mackenzie v. Steeves, 8
which is another prime example of ephemeral delivery. In that case, a gift of
an automobile was upheld despite the fact that the sole semblance of a de-
livery consisted in this, the taking of possession and the use of the car by
the donee, after the donor's death. In thus deciding the court was moved to
say that there are circumstances where "the intent of the donor will answer
for the act of delivery."3 9
While such decisions are not run-of-the-mine cases they portend a relaxa-
tion and promise future developments in the field of delivery. Nor do the
stated departures spell the limit of abandonment of orthodox delivery. Indeed
there is discernible a tendency towards the acceptance of a certain form of
symbolical delivery-the delivery of an informal instrument of gift. A ready
instance of such a delivery is the case of Hawkins v. Union Trust Co.,40
wherein the gift inter vivos of a stored boat was accomplished by tradition
of an informal letter of gift. Clearly, here, no semblance of control was trans-
ferred. The justification for the recognition of such a gift must rest on the
fact that the written instrument bears upon its face the indelible expression of
the donor's intention. One might well argue that the delivery of such an
instrument, provided it clearly expresses the donor's intention, and accu-
rately describes the object of gift, is entitled to acceptance as a mode of
delivery, on an equal plane with tradition of a key.
Since the law of constructive delivery is not at all times clear, and its appli-
cation difficult at best, the cases of each jurisdiction should be carefully con-
sidered if a fairly safe prediction is to be made as to the conclusion of a court
on any given fact situation. 41  This should be noted, that, throughout the
trends previously cited, there is one motif, the driving force of the desire to
effectuate clearly evidenced donative intent, and the corresponding breakdown
in the classical formula of delivery.
37. Pushcart v. Dry Dock Savings Inst., 140 Misc. 579, 251 N. Y. Supp. 184 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1931).
38. 98 Wash. 17, 167 Pac. 50 (1917).
39. Id. at 52.
40. 187 App. Div. 472, 175 N. Y. Supp. 694 (1st Dep't 1919).
41. Compare the relaxed conception of delivery in Mackenzie v. Steeves, 98 Wash. 17,
167 Pac. 50 (1917), with the relatively strict application of the requirement of delivery
in Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898). The courts of Now York
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"Delivery" of Choses in Action
Choses in action, being incorporeal, are incapable of concrete delivery in the
same manner and with the same effect as tangible personal property. Broadly
stated, such intangibles are rights to exact corresponding obligations, and in
this respect they differ from tangible chattels which are inherently valuable.
A typical chose in action springs into being when a debtor-creditor relation-
ship is established. Even the most casual consideration of the nature of a
chose in action will disclose the inherent difficulties which must inevitably
arise when we are discussing the matter of delivery of choses in actionA2
Fully recognizing the basic difference between a chose in action and a chose
in possession, the objective of the law has been, none the less, to assimilate
the rules governing the delivery of choses in action with the requirements per-
taining to delivery of chattels.43 The value of such a unification will be the
more readily apparent if we suppose a safe deposit box case wherein the box
contains jewelry, stock certificates, bonds, and insurance policies. Destruc-
tive of the donor's single intent to give the entire contents, would be the con-
clusion, that tradition of the key would work a gift of the jewelry but not
of the choses in action which the documents represent. Fortunately, in this
instance, everything would pass by the gift.4" This tendency toward unifi-
cation is so marked that it is becoming increasingly more difficult to show
a trend in gift cases without utilizing those which consider choses in action
and choses in possession. A ready example is that group of cases wherein the
requirement of delivery has been satisfied by tradition of an informal instru-
ment of gift. Gifts of choses in action as well as chattels have been thus
effected. 45
Economic life, ever growing in complexity, could not fail to stamp its im-
pression on the law. The widespread use of commercial documents has induced
legal recognition of the fact that for some purposes, certain choses in action
are liberal in applying the doctrine of constructive or symbolical delivery. See ca cited
in note 82, infra.
42. To the effect that there must be a delivery to complete a gift of a chose in action,
see Baskett v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 614 (1882); Parish v. Stone, 31 Ma s. 198, 205,
206 (1S83); Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, 28 Eng. Reprints 275 (Ch. 1752). If the
chose in action is represented by no written instrument there must be a written agn-
ment. Parker v. Mott, 181 N. C. 485, 107 S. E. S00 (1921). In England, prior to the
Judicature Act of 1873, assignments of legal choses in action were invalid. It was sub-
sequently held, under the Act, that these assignments were irrevocable even if gratuitous.
Hambleton v. Brown [1917J 2 K. B. 93.
43. This tendency toward unification is not only noticeable in cases of construc-
tive delivery of obligations evidenced by commercial documents, but in those cases wherein
a written instrument of gift is delivered instead of the res. See Rxsr=A =.rzu Co:-mrs
(1932) § 158(1) (a).
44. See cases cited in notes 52-56, infra. Cf. Stephenson's Adm'r v. King, 81 Ky.
425 (1883).
45. Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919) (chozz




have been immersed in the tangible chattels which evidence them.40 This
is especially true of negotiable instruments such as bonds, bills, and notes;
and in a lesser degree of stock certificates, savings bank books, and life insur-
ance policies. In the leading English case on gifts causa mortis of choses in
action,47 Lord Hardwicke said that he had, in Snellgrove v. Baily,48 upheld
a gift completed by delivery of a bond, because the bond had to be proffered
in court, and for the further reason that "the law allows it a locality.1
4 9
Implicit in this reasoning are two notions which serve as the basis for the
recognition of gifts of choses in action through delivery of commercial instru-
ments; first, that commercial usage has localized, as it were, certain choses in
action in written instruments, and, second, that delivery of such a formal written
instrument takes from the donor, and confers upon the donee, control of the
obligation thereby evidenced. "Possession of the document, therefore, controls
the enforcement of the right. Such documents are for this reason proper
symbols of the intangible rights that they evidence."50
It is generally accepted that the delivery of a bond, or negotiable instru-
ments such as bearer, or endorsed order, bills or notes, will work a gift of the
obligations thereby evidenced; 51 the enforcement of the right is conditional
upon the surrender of the document. Moreover this rule, based on the notion
of the transfer of control of the res, is followed, in the United States, when
-the instrument transferred is an unendorsed or otherwise non-negotiable bill or
note of a third party,52 an insurance policy, 53 a savings bank book, 4 a non-
46. See Williston, Gifts of Rights under Contracts in Writing by Delivery of the
Writing (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 1, 11. The physical presence of commercial documents,
for some purposes, gives the state jurisdiction, though the owners of the obligations
thereby evidenced be domiciled outside that state. See, Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N. Y.
381, 390, 187 N. E. 65, 69 (1933). But cf. the rule, that under the Constitution of the
United States, the situs may be insufficient to empower the state, where such documents
are situated, to impose a property tax on them, though the owner resides in another state.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); First National Bank v.
Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932).
47. Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, 28 Eng. Reprints 275 (Ch. 1752).
48. 3 Atk. 214, 26 Eng. Reprints 924 (Ch. 1744).
49. Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, 442, 28 Eng. Reprints 275, 282 (Ch. 1752). Under
the doctrine of profert the bond certificate was an indispensable part of the pleading in an
action on the bond. Hence, it was said, that when the certificate was banded to the
donee, the donor was completely deprived of dominion, and the donee vested therewith.
For an explanation of this doctrine of profert see Bruton, Requirement of Delivery as
Applied to Gifts of Choses in Action (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 837, 842. As to the "locality"
of intangibles represented by commercial instruments see note 46, supra.
50. WiLisToN, supra, note 46, at 6.
51. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) 169-170; WIT.TsS, PERSONAL PROPERTY
(18th ed. 1926) 449-500.
52. Harrell v. Nicholson, 119 Ga. 458, 46 S. E. 623 (1904); Wing v. Merchant, 57
Me. 383 (1869); Blazo v. Cochrane, 71 N. H. 585, 53 Atl. 1026 (1902); Westerlo v. DeWitt,
36 N. Y. 340 (1867); Hopkins v. Manchester, 16 R. 1. 663, 19 Atl. 243 (1889). The
telivery of the donor's own note will in effect, be a gift in futuro and unenforceable for
want of consideration. Wisler v. Tomb, 169 Cal. 382, 146 Pac. 876 (1915); Dougherty v.
Salt, 227 N. Y. 200, 125 N. E. 94 (1919).
53. Knowles v. Knowles, 205 Mass. 290, 91 N. E. 213 (1910); Travelers' Insurance
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negotiable bond,55 or a certificate of stock.50 In England an anomalous rule
is enforced with respect to tradition of this type of non-negotiable document;
gifts causa inortis are upheld,57 but those intcr vivos are revocable. 8 The
doctrine that equity will not aid a volunteer stands in the way of a valid
gift inter vivos. But where a gift causa mortis is alleged and the instrument
has been delivered, equity will hold the gift irrevocable. There is some
uncertainty as to the basic reason why such gifts have been upheld in Eng-
land. One notion is that delivery of the instrument confers a power coupled
with an interest.59 On the other hand it has been contended that the reason-
ing of the courts is that in a gift causa inortis title is not transferred before
the death of the donor, and therefore equity is not called upon to aid a vol-
unteer but rather is effectuating the decedent's donative intent as against his
personal representatives.6° In America this distinction between the two
types of gifts has been criticized. 0 ' Our courts uphold the gift in both in-
stances.
These gifts effectuated by delivery of a commercial instrument commonly
accepted as representative of a certain obligation, noticeably depart from the
rule requiring absolute transfer of dominion. Usually the obligor requires
some set mode of transferring or realizing on the obligation. Nevertheless,
it has been held that delivery of a savings bank book will work a gift of the
account despite the fact that the bank requires a written order.02 The analogy
Co. v. Grant, 54 N. J. Eq. 208, 33 At. 1060 (1896); Opitz v. Lanier, 118 Wis. 527, 95
N. W. 948 (1903).
54. Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88 (1869); Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364 (1873); Ridden
v. Thrall, 125 N. Y. 572, 26 N. E. 627 (1891); Snidow v. Brotherton, 140 Va. 187, 124
S. E. 182 (1924). Note (1926) 40 A. L. R. 1249.
Delivery of a commercial bank book will not work a gift of the account. Jones v.
Weakly, 99 Ala. 441, 12 So. 420 (1892); Szabo v. Speckman, 73 Fla. 374, 74 So. 411
(1917); Brophy v. Haeberle, 220 App. Div. 511, 221 N. Y. Supp. 698 (4th Dep't 1927).
Contra: Gray's Adm'r v. Dixon, 255 Ky. 239, 73 S. W. (2d) 6 (1934). It is generally
considered that the commercial bank book is a mere statement of account and hence de-
livery does not deprive the donor of control, or give to the donee an effective means of
control.
55. Mangan v. Howard, 238 Mass. 1, 130 N. E. 76 (1921).
56. Smith v. Meeker, 153 Iowa 655, 133 N. W. 1058 (1912); Herbert v. Simon, 220
Mass. 480, 108 N. E. 65 (1915); Miller v. Silverman, 247 N. Y. 447, 160 N. E. 910 (1928);
First National Bank v. Holland, 99 Va. 495, 39 S. E. 126 (1901).
57. Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bli. N. S. 497, 4 Eng. Reprints 959 (1827); In re Dillon,
Duffin v. Duffin, 44 Ch. D. 76 (1890). For an interesting case showing the marked
distinction between gifts causa inortis and inter vivos see, In re Wasserberg [1915] 1
Ch. 195.
58. Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mlyl. & C. 226, 40 Eng. Reprints 361 (Ch. 1836).
59. This was Professor Ames' view. See, Costigan, Gifts Inter Vivos of Choses in Action
(1911) 27 L. Q. Rv. 326.
60. See, Rundell, Gifts of Cioses in Action (1918) 27 YazM L. J. 643.
61. See, Wifliston, Gifts of Rights under Contracts in Writing by Delivery of tlse
Writing (1930) 40 YaLE L. J. 1.
62. Goodson v. Liles, 209 Ala. 335, 96 So. 262 (1932); Donovan v. Hibernia Savings
& L. Soc., 90 Cal. App. 489, 265 Pac. 995 (1928); Brooks v. Mitchell, 163 Md. 1, 161 At.
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to the safe deposit box cases, where the donor retains a duplicate key, sug-
gests itself. In neither case is absolute dominion transferred, but in each the
gift is upheld. Similarly gifts of stock have been upheld where there was
delivery of the certificate but not of the required written authorization to
transfer on the books of the corporation. 3 Gifts of insurance policies, in
analogy to other commercial instruments, have been upheld without written
assignment.0 4 It has been suggested that these formalities required by the
obligor are for its protection, and consequently should not affect the disposal
of the res as between the donor and the donee.0 5
A vexing problem presents itself when, in an attempt to effectuate a gift,
A hands B a book setting forth a statement of accounts receivable from C,
or a written contract entered into with C. The authorities are not in agree-
ment as to the validity of the gift of an obligation thus evidenced, when an
attempt is made to satisfy the requirement of delivery in the manner above
set forth. The Restatement of the Law of Contracts rule would not support
a gift thus attempted, 66 and this position would seem to be in harmony with
the rule that delivery of a commercial bank book will not work a gift of the
account therein stated. In arguing in defense of the Restatement rule an
eminent authority has said: "It is desirable that the possession of the docu-
ment should carry with it without litigation the implication that the possessor
is the person entitled to receive performance, and, what is more important,
that nobody without that document is entitled to receive performance.'"
Some courts, however, have been unimpressed by such arguments and have
seen fit to effectuate clearly evidenced donative intent by holding that the
delivery of the account book or written contract is a valid symbolical delivery
of the corresponding obligations.0 8
261 (1932); In re Curran, 129 At. 821 (N. J. Orph. Ct. 1925); Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N.
Y. 572, 26 N. E. 627 (1891) (leading case).
63. See cases cited in note 56, supra. Contra: Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq.
455, 21 AUt. 1054 (1891) (on ground that there was therefore no absolute transfer of
dominion).
64. Opitz v. Karel, 118 Wis. 527, 95 N. W. 948, 62 L. R. A. 684 (1903).
65. Ibid.
66. RFSTATEM , CONTRACTS (1932) § 158(1)(b). For an article advocating the ex-
tension of the Restatement rule see, Bruton, The Requirement of Delivery as Applied to
Choses in Action (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 837, and in reply, Williston, Gifts of Rights under
Contracts in Writing by Delivery of the Writing (1931) 40 YAL. L. J. 1.
67. WIuxsToN, supra, note 66, at 14. (Italics supplied).
68. Poirot v. Gundlach, 1 N. E. (2d) 801 (I1. App. 1936); Jones, Adm'r v. Moove,
102 Ky. 591, 44 S. W. 126 (1898); Ilt re Huggin's Estate, 204 Pa. 167, 53 At. 746 (1902);
Davie v. Davie, 47 Wash. 231, 91 Pac. 950 (1907). Contra: Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J. L. 373,
26 AUt. 803 (1893), and those cases which deny the validity of gifts attempted to be
completed by delivery of a commercial bank book. See cases cited in note 55, supra.
But see, upholding a gift by delivery of a commercial bank book on the ground of a
symbolical delivery, Gray's Adm'r v. Dixon, 255 Ky. 239, 73 S. W. (2d) 6 (1934). It
should be noted that in these commercial bank book cases the donor could have with-




An unusual situation is presented when the creditor, in the presence of
his debtor and the donee, makes a declaration of gift of a chose in action not
evidenced by a commercial document. It has been held that the assent of
the debtor to this order of the creditor will complete the gifl c In such a case,
one looks in vain for a delivery; an oral assignment is deemed sufficient. It
would seem that in the case of choses in action as well as chattels the require-
ment of delivery has paled before the desire to effectuate donative intention.
Delivery of a Written Instrument of Gift
From early times it has been said that delivery of an instrument under
seal, purporting to pass title, would work a gift of chattels, and this was
declared to be an exception engrafted on the requirement of actual delivery.70
Though American courts have followed this rule,7 ' the source of this magic
power of the deed is wrapped in obscurity. Probably the dual aspect of the
deed, as a conveyance and a contract, has had a befogging influence. The
theory has been advanced that the evolution of the actions of debt and detinue
which ultimately resulted in the notion that property passes upon an agree-
ment to sell a specific chattel may have been the source of this power. 2  Some
courts have held that the form of the instrument imports a consideration,
and that the donor is estopped to assert that he has not granted to the donee
a power of control and dominion. 73 Others base their conclusion on the doc-
trine of symbolical delivery. 4  Sometimes a court wavers between the two.Y
69. Ogdon v. Washington National Bank, 82 Ind. App. 187, 145 N. E. 514 (1924);
Dinslage v. Stratman, 105 Neb. 274, 180 N. W. 81 (1920). Cf. Murphy v. Bordwell, 83
Minn. 154, 85 N. W. 915 (1901). For an application of the principle of novation, in a
similar stuation, see the concurring opinion of Sanborn, J. in Castle v. Persons, 117 Fed.
835, 842 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902). The holding of the cases above cited would seem to be at
odds with the rule that where a chose in action is not represented by a commercial instru-
ment, it can only be transferred by written assignment Parker v. Mott, 181 N. C. 485,
107 S. E. 500 (1921).
70. The rule was stated in a dictun in Irons v. Smallplece, 2 B. & AId. 551, 552,
105 Eng. Reprints 467,_46S (K. B. 1819). The prior history of gifts of chattels by deed
is traced in Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q. B. D. 57 (1890).
71. Walker v. Crews, 73 Ala. 412 (1882); Burkett v. Doty, 32 Cal. App. 337, 162
Pac. 1042 (1916); Wyche v. Greene, 11 Ga. 159 (1852); Taylor v. Purdy, 151 Ky. 82,
151 S. W. 45 (1912); Meyers v. Meyers, 99 N. J. Eq. 560, 134 At. 95 (Ch. 1926); Younge
v. Moore, 1 Strob. L. 48 (S. C. 1846); Rennie v. Washington Trust Co, 140 Wash. 472,
249 Pac. 992 (1926); see Fulton v. Fulton, 48 Barb. 581, 590 (N. Y. 1866). Contra:
McWillie v. Van Vacter, 35 Miss. 428 (1858)
72. 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORy oF Eornxsa L, w (3d ed. 1927) 357-358.
73. Connor v. Trawick's Adm'r, 37 Ala. 289 (1861) (gift failed because instrument not
under seal); Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591 (1852). Under this theory the deed should
merely operate as a symbol in states where the seal does not import consideration. But
perhaps the instrument not under seal will yet have the same effect as sealed instruments.
See Roberts, The Necessity of Delivery in Gifts (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 313, 316.
74. "It has been held that a deed, delivered, operates as an estoppel because of our
ancient reverence for sealed instruments, but the weight of authority is that the delivery
of the deed is an effective symbolical delivery of the thing given." Meyers v. Meyers,
99 N. 3. Eq. 560, 561, 134 At]. 95, 96 (1926). If "effective symbolical delivery" means an
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Whatever the reason, one may safely say that where the seal has all its com-
mon law force a gift of personalty may be effected by deed or instrument under
seal without transfer of the res. Where inroads have been made by statute
into this ancient stronghold one may well proceed with caution. Thus, in
New York, where the pristine sanctity of the seal no longer prevails, as it is
neither conclusive nor presumptive evidence of consideration,70 the theory
of estoppel by deed based upon the notion of consideration would seem un-
tenable. The efficacy of the deed in such a case, if it is to rest at all, must
rest on its symbolical character. If this be so, and a mere written "l.s."
by statute be deemed sufficient, then one might well argue that any writing
which clearly evidences an intention to convey title should be deemed suffi-
cient. The seal has not been dethroned; the ordinary writing has been subli-
mated. This result has been attained in California by statute.77
The cases disagree as to the necessity of delivering the res when an attempt
has been made to effectuate a gift by transferring a formal instrument not
under seal, purporting to pass title, such as an assignment or bill of sale.
Some deem delivery of the instrument sufficient; 78 others require delivery
of the res as well; 79 still others would give it effect where the circumstances
would permit a symbolical delivery.80
The weight of authority looks with disfavor on the delivery of an informal
writing as a means of effecting a gift."' Opposed is a minority view, rep-
resented by certain New York cases wherein transfers of letters of gift were
deemed good symbolical deliveries under the stated circumstances. 82  In
ipso facto transfer of title independent of circumstances because of the seal, then a chattel
might well be present and capable of delivery yet the gift by the deed upheld. But If the
ordinary meaning of symbolical delivery is used then its application should be restricted
to those situations wherein actual delivery of the res is impossible, impracticable, or incon-
venient, depending on the lex loci.
75. Younge v. Moore, 1 Strob. L. 48 (S. C. 1846).
76. N. Y. Civ. PrAc. ACT (1936) § 342 (1).
77. Driscoll v. Driscoli, 143 Cal. 528, 77 Pac. 471 (1904); Francoeur v. Beatty,
170 Cal. 740, 151 Pac. 123 (1915). See also Sylvain v. Page, 84 Mont. 424, 276 Pac.
16, 63 A. L. R. 537 (1929). For a compilation and treatment of the various state statutes
in this connection, see 1 WUSTON, CONTRACTS (rev'd ed. 1936) § 218.
78. Francoeur v. Beatty, 170 Cal. 740, 151 Pac. 123 (1915); Humphrey v. Ogden,
53 Colo. 309, 125 Pac. 110 (1912); Fontron Loan & Trust Co. v. Korzuszkiewicz, 125 Kan.
725, 266 Pac. 649 (1928); Sylvain v. Page, 84 Mont. 424, 276 Pac. 16, 63 A. L. R,
537 (1929) (excellent note on delivery by written instruments).
79. Connor v. Trawick's Adm'r, 37 Ala. 289 (1861); In re Salzwedel's Estate, 171
Wis. 441, 177 N. W. 586 (1920). Cf. Lee v. Lee, 5 F. (2d) 767 (App. D. C. 1925) (de-
cided under a statute).
80. Allen-West Commission v. Grumbles, 129 Fed. 287 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904); In re
Fenton, 182 Iowa 346, 165 N. W. 463 (1917); Lipson v. Evans, 133 Md. 370, 105 Ati.
312 (1918).
81. Lee v. Lee, 5 F. (2d) 767 (App. D. C. 1925); Payne v. Powell, 68 Ky. 248 (1869);
Foulke v. Hichman, 259 S. W. 496 (1924); cf. In re Salzwedel's Estate, 177 WIs. 441,
171 N. W. 586 (1920).
82. McGavic v. Cossum, 72 App. Div. 35, 76 N. Y. Supp. 305 (1st Dep't 1902);
Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176 N. Y. Supp 225 (1st Dep't 1919); Hawkins v.
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Matter of Cohn,s3 the donor on the occasion of his wife's birthday gave her,
in the presence of the family, an informal writing purporting to give five
hundred shares of stock. The stock certificates were not available for physi-
cal tradition. It was held that a valid gift inter vivos had been completed.
In reaching this conclusion the court said that the rule requiring delivery
is subject to exceptions, and to apply it correctly resort should be had to the
reason for the rule. This, it said, was founded in an attempt to prevent
imposition and fraud. But, where there was an instrument of gift, executed
and delivered, there was no necessity for actual' delivery since evidence of
the right to possession had been placed in the hands of the donee.
Even when a writing is not called upon to play the role of a symbol, one
can not disregard'its persuasive force as an evidentiary factor. The fact that
an actual delivery took place may be inferred from the circumstances and the
existence of an instrument of gift furnishes a basis for readily drawing that
inference8 4
Conclusion
The necessity of obviating mistake and fraud has been the moving principle
tending to perpetuate the requirement of delivery. Delivery is the natural
way of effecting a gift, but its value springs from deeper roots. Delivery
impresses the donor with the gravity of the act, is a persuasive indication
to the world of the occurrence of a gift transaction, and gives to the donee
prinm facie evidence of the validity of his title.85  If this be the value of
delivery then it would seem evident that certain fact situations might well be
recognized as valid gift transactions which are considered as shining examples
of relaxed delivery. Certainly the delivery of an informal writing, which
clearly evidences donative intent, would possess this threefold value. In
fact, as far as donative intention is concerned, it would be a more signifi-
cant act than tradition of a key, for it bears upon its face the written inten-
tion and signature of the donor.
Out of the welter of confusion which abounds in the cases, with regard to
the requirement of delivery in effecting gifts of personal property, certain
fundamental propositions emerge. Although courts may disagree as to just
what circumstances will justify the conclusion that a legal delivery has taken
Union Trust Co., 187 App. Div. 472, 175 N. Y. Supp. 694 (1st Dep't 1919); Matter of
Goodwin, 114 Iisc. 39, 185 N. Y. Supp. 461 (Surr. Ct. 1920); Matter of Stalden, 194
N. Y. Supp. 349 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
83. See note 82, supra.
34. Delivery may be inferred. Rix v. Hunt, 16 App. Div. 540, 44 N. Y. Supp. 988
(4th Dep't 1897); Gross v. Smith, 132 N. C. 604, 44 S. E. Ill (1903); Schauer v. Von
Schauer, 138 S. W. 145 (Tex. 1911). For cases in which a writing appeared see Miller v.
Silverman, 247 N. Y. 447, 160 N. E. 910 (1928); Matter of Braun, 121 Misc. 18, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 781 (Surr. Ct. 1923). "An examination of a large number of cases in this state
discloses the significant facts that (1) in every case where the gift was not sustained, the
gift rested upon parol evidence; and (2) in every case of a gift evidenced by the ddivery
of an instrument of gift, the gift has been sustained.' Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div.
392, 395-6, 176 N. Y. Supp. 225, 227 (2d Dep't 1919).
85. See note 8, supra.
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place, with few exceptions, they agree that there must be some act of delivery,
whether there be tradition of the res, or something in lieu thereof. Intention,
alone, will not do. Furthermore, it appears that the erosion that has taken
place in the original conception of delivery is due to the desire to effectuate
donative intent, when that is clearly evidenced."0 And finally, there is a
slight tendency discernible toward the acceptance of tradition of an informal
instrument of gift as an adequate substitute for the delivery of the res. It
would seem reasonable to predict that this view will be given a wider legal
recognition than it has heretofore received, in view of the fact that the statu-
tory desanctification of the seal has given the informal instrument a new signifi.
cance.
8 7
In formulating rules with regard to the requirement of delivery, it is neces-
sary to strike a balance between two opposing forces; the desire to effectuate
donative intention, on the one hand, and the prevention of the assertion of
spurious claims, on the other. It is felt that a proper balance would be struck
if legal recognition were given to the rule that, as between the donor and donee,
delivery of an informal written instrument of gift, clearly expressing donative
intention and properly describing the res, creates a valid gift of the property
therein specified.
86. For an article demonstrating that the effectuation of clearly evidenced donative
intent is in the ascendency as opposed to the strict requirement of delivery see Roberts,
The Necessity of Delivery in Making Gifts (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 313. See also the
comment by Harlan F. Stone, (1920) 20 CoL. L. Rav. 196.
87. "It is submitted that they might better have said that statutes doing away with the
necessity of seals had raised unsealed instruments to the position formerly held by sealed
instruments and that it is now possible to make a gift of a chattel by a writing not under
seal." Roberts, The Necessity of Delivery in Making Gifts (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 313, 316.
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